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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
1n:TTY

.\SKBI~~~.

Plaiutiff,
vs.
I~Dl'~TRl.\L

rrr.\H,

COJIMISR[ON OF
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~PERRY IL\~n

CORPOIL\TJO~

and LIBERTY

~IFTrAL Ii\SlTlL\XCT~

COJ[P.L\XY,

n (, re }/(1n 1, t ·".

DEFE~D~\XTS'

PI,:TlTION FOR REIIEARING

AXD BRIEF IX SFPPOR'"r THEREOF

PETITIOX FOR REHEARTXO
Ddendant~

Sperry Rand Corporation and Liberty

llutual Insurance Cmnpany petition tlw Court for a
f(lhParin~
and rearo·ument
of the above entitled ca~P
'
/""

upon tlw following grounds:
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POINT 1.
THE COURT'S DECISION DISREGARDS BOTH STATUTORY AND ITS OWN LONG-ESTABLISHED DECISIONAL
LAW STANDARDS FOR REVIEWING DENIAL OF AN
AWARD BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.
POINT 2.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT RESULTS IN CONFUSION AND UNCERTAINTY BOTH AS TO THE SCOPE OF
THE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND THE STABILITY AND MEANING OF ITS DECISIONS, AND IT MAKES ADMINISTRATION
OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT VERY DIFFICULT AND UNCERTAIN.
POINT 3.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT IMPOSES AN UNDULY HEAVY BURDEN ON INDUSTRY AS REGARDS
EMPLOYMENT-RELATED ACTIVITIES AND WILL CAUSE
EMPLOYERS TO RESTRICT SEVERELY OR TO CANCEL
MANY 0 F THE BENEFITS AND SERVICES WHICH THEY
HAVE HERETOFORE PROVIDED.
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\\'HERE I•'() B 1•:, defendants pray that the judgment
and opinion of tlw ( 'onrt be recalled and a reargument

btl}H'I'Illittt>d of thP entire emw .

.\ hrit.f in support of this petition is filed herewith .
.TORN H. SNOW

701 Continental Bank Building
~alt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendants

.IOIIX II. ~XO'Y Hereby certifies that he is attonwy for dPfPndant 1wtitioners herein, and that in his
opinion there is good rm1sP to believe the decision of the
Court is (lfroneous and that the case should be reheard
and rt•a r~\11'( l. as prayed for in said petition.
ll.\ TED this ..k. day of .May, 1964.

Q,-'---

_I " (

~

g___ ~--.r-

················-~-~-----------·------·--------------------------------------------------------

\_

JOHN H. SNOW
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PE,TI'TION FOR REHEARING
POINT 1.
THE COURT'S DECISION DISREGARDS BOTH STATUTORY AND ITS OWN LONG-ESTABLISHED DECISIONAL
LAW STANDARDS FOR REVIEWING DENIAL OF AN
AWARD BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.

In literally dozens of cases since the Workmen's
Compensation Law was adopted by Utah nearly 50
years ago this Court has affirmed and reaffirmed the
scope of the responsibility and discretion which are reserved to the Industrial Commission in Workmen's Compensation cases and the Court has determined and reiterated the standards by which the Court has deemed
itself bound by statute, by principles of proper judicial
administration and by self-imposed judicial restraint, in
reviewing determinations of the Commission.
Repeated so often and consistently in these cases
that citation is unnecessary are the principles that great
liberality must be granted to the Commission in considering and weighing the evidPnce before it; that findings
and conclusions of thP Com1nission must be upheld if
supported by any substantial, cmnpetent evidence; that
the Court will not substitute its own judgment for that
of the Commission as to findings and conclusions unless
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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it be ~hown that the Com1nission acted arbitrarily and
t·npri<·iously in failing to arrive at the only reasonable
finding warranted h~· the evidence; and, that findings
and <'nnrlusions of thP Commission are treated the same
n:-; a jury verdict and upheld if supported by any evidPnrP PVPn though on occasion such findings and con<'lnsions may differ radically from those the Court would
itself tnakP, and <>Y<'n though occasional hardship is
l':tii:-:Pd therPhy to applicants who are denied an award.
Althon~h in Strottd v. Industrial Comm. <1954), 272
P.~<l 1~7. ~ U. :2d :270, cited in the Court's opinion of

.\pril lfl, 1964, the Commission's denial of an award was
annulled on aprwal, the Court there was careful to explain at sonw length the basis for its decision so as to
bring the case within the scope of the Court's power of
ft'\iew, as that power had been consistently delineated
and explained in its prior decisions. The Court approved
a h'~t which had been previously set out in Norris v.
Industrial C'ommissioll (1936), 61 P.2d -±13, 90 Utah 256,
by which to determine whf'tlwr or not the Commission's
findin~~ become a 1natter of law for the Court to review.
That tP~t requires essentially that before a Commission
dPtermination can be overturned as a matter of law the
'
t>ddence must be undisputed, credible, unbiased, reasonable. con\incing and subject to but a single explanation
:'i\ n~ to ~npport the conclusion ''that the commission
could only arrive at onr conclusion from the evidence,
fUid it jn11nd contrary to that inrritnble conclusion."
(Emphasi ~ added.)
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Significantly, the Court there noted that (1) tlw
instrumentality which caused the harm - the revolver
- "was authorized and required" hy the employer and
was carried "for the benefit of the employer," so that
the type of accident suffered was readily foreseeable as
"an ordinary risk of (being) a police officer;" (2.) the
accident occurred on the employer's premises and clearly within the spatial area within which the employee
normally performed his tasks for the employer; (3) the
accident occurred at a time when the employee had
actually entered upon his employment, he having arrived
at his place of employment h~T appointment to deliver to
his fellow employees, in his official capacity as a police
officer, a special car which belonged to his employer;
and ( 4) the written decision of the Commission clearly
showed that it had mistakenly applied well-established,
simple, legal rules in concluding that the employee had
either not yet entered upon his emplopnent or that he
had departed therefrom in pursuing a program of his
own at the time of the accident and, hence, that the
coverage of the Act did not apply. Thus, the undisputed
facts showed not only that the e1nployee ·was in fact in
the cour~e of his employn1ent since he was actually on
duty at the time of the accident but, also, that it aros('
out of the employment, since his presence at the accident
scene and the instrumentality which caused the accident
were both directly related to duties which were expected
and required of him by his employ0r.
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On thPRP facts the Court was justified in ruling that
t lw cvi<lPTH'P logically and reasonably would support
only onP conclusion and that the Commission found
l'nntrary to that inPvitable conclusion due to its mistaken
application of simplP rulEls of law.
YiPwPd in this light, the Stroud case does not
rrprP~Pnt

a radical departure from but, rather, conforms

to and reaffirm~ thP principles adhered to in the numeron~ l; tah cases referred to above. It preserves to the
Commission thP measure of discretion and responsibility
which it must have in this type of case if it is to be
anything more than a mere assembler of evidence for
tlw ~uprenw Court, if it is to exercise any meaningful
judgment whatPver, and if its determinations are to
have any real stability or meaning for employers and
PmployPP~ alike. It maintains the same standards for
l'PYiPw and tlw ::;anw principle of judicial restraint from
interference with determinations of subordinate regulatory and judicial bodies which have so long been adhPrt'd to in lTtah and in other states and which have,
over many decades, proved indispensable to proper
jndirial administration and to stability and dignity of
ndmini~trative and judicial determinations. Any other

,.iPw of the Strnud rasP renders the Commission virtually impotent and without authority as to the very
matter~ it wn~ created to pass upon and determine.
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In the present case there is simply no supportable
basis for a conclusion, using the test from the Norris
and Stroud decisions, that the Commission "could only
arrive at one conclusion from the evidence, and that it
found contrary to that inevitable conclusion." In sharp
contrast with the evidence disclosed in the Stroud case,
the evidence here showed at best a very fragile and
tenuous relationship between the injuries and the employment. This relationship, while sufficient to support
an award had one been made, was nonetheless much too
slight to compel the conclusion as a matter of law that
the Commission's determination \Yas contrary to tlw
single possible, inevitable result.
The evidence here showed that ( 1) the accident occured outside of applicant's regular hours of employment since she had "checked out" for the noon period
and was on her own time ; ( 2) the injuries were sustained
outside the spatial limits of applicant's employment
since she had passed into the area where the employer's
control over her was non-existent, even conceding the
employer maintained some measure of control over its
lessee, Clark, Inc.; (3) the instrun1entality which caused
her injury was neither owned, controlled, handled nor
authorized by her employer, nor was it otherwise related
to or in any way beneficial to her employer or its business; ( 4) at the time of the accident applicant was
engaged in no activity for or beneficial to her employer,
she being, instead, free to make use of her time as she
pleased; and ( 5) except for the existence of the lease
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lu·twt•Pn her PlllployPr and the cafeteria operator, and
PX<'Ppt for t Itt• location of the eafdPria, which distinctions
an· at mo~t but inconsPquential, applicant's injuries had
no mon• r(llation to her employment than had they been
int·m-red at the Naval Cafeteria or in Clearfield or
I .a~·ton.

It ~PPm~ inconceivable that on the basis of this
uncontradicted evidence, which appears finnly to support tlw Commission's denial as not only permissible
hut <'OITPd.. the Conrt could hold that the only inevitable
ennelusion to havP lwc>n arrived at was that the injuries
nro~P out of or in the course of the employment. Yet
th~ Court's decision of April 15, 1964, must be based
upon ~n<'h a holding, unless the Court has decided to
mak~ a radical departure frmn its former standards of
judicial reviPw a~ referred to above, and to take into its
own hands, "·ithout legislative authorization or other
apparent reason to do so, the discretion, judgment and
rP~ponsibility which have heretofore reposed in the
Commission. The Court's decision must rest upon one
or the other of tlwse two bases, although the decision
t'ai I~ to indicate which. Yet the far-reaching implicatinn~ of either basis for decision suggest the conclusion
ti1:1t neither "·as intended hy the Court.

The first basis for decision as noted above is

nPitlwr logical nor reasonable. The second basis subwrt:-: and undennines the YPry foundations of judicial
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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review and judicial administration which have been
followed so long and so consistently in Utah and elsewhere and upon which our employees, employ<'rs,
legislators and citizens generally have come to rely and
depend. Either basis arrogates to the Court powns
which belong in the Commission. Either basis, if sustained, will create uncertainty and confusion in Commission determinations and leave the Commission
without useable standards or guidelines within which
its responsibilities and its judgment are to be exercised.
In a large nun1ber, if not in the majority, of casPs
before the Commission the evidence \Yill meet the
standards of reliability which are enumerated in the
S~roud case. Only seldom, however, will the evidence
satisfy the remaining portion of the "stringent test"
therein set forth - that portion which requires that
the evidence be capable of supporting but a single,
inevitable conclusion which is contrary to the Commission's determination. Clearly, therefore, the Court
must apply both portions of this test if it is to preserve
any measure of stability and certainty in this large
segment of cases before the Commission.
To disregard the second, and most important, portion of this test as occurred in the Court's decision of

'

April 15, 19·64, will require, as to each of the cases in
which the evidence is reliable and undisputed, an arl
hoc determination by the Supreme Court on its partieSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ular fad~, conditions and circumstances. And, in all
such ea~P8 the Commission would be relegated to the
rolP of a mere collector of evidence for the Supreme
1
( ourt.
Such a result runs directly contrary to the obvious
purpose of the legislature in creating the Industrial
Commission. This purpose was to repose in it a suffiritlnt dignity, discretion and power to give stability
and meaning to its determinations and to avoid the
t>:dreme delay and cost to applicants and employers
of resort to the courts, except to correct abuses of discretion and arbitrary acts of the Commission upon
review in the Supreme Court. Certainly it was never
intended and it does not make sense that the Supreme
t 0Urt should overturn determinations of the Commis!:'ion and substitute its own judgment for that of the
Commi~~ion simply because it does not agree with
thPm, as i~ apparently tlw case here.
1

In its decision of April 15, 1964, the Court disregarded its own basic standards for review and refused
to abide hy its own clear declarations, such as that
eontained in Kent 'l'. Industrial Commission <1936), 57
P.~d i~-+. 89 lTtah 381, at page 726 of the Pacific Report~. a~ follows:
·· 'Yhen we are asked to overturn the findings
and conclusions of the commission denying compPnsation, it must be made clearly to appear that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the commission acted wholly without cause in
rejecting or in refusing to believe or give effect
to the evidence. It was not intended by the Workmen's Compen.sation Act ... that this court, in
matters of evrdence, should to any extent substitute the judgment of the court upon factual
matters for the judgment of the commission."
* * * * *
"That there will occasionally arise cases that
appear hard, and those from the conclusions of
which we may radically differ, must be admitted.
By the law, however, we rnust abide."
* * * * *
"As indicated, the position may at times
appear to be a hardship upon applicants, especially those to whom the commission refuses to
make an award upon apparently credible and
substantial evidence even at times apparently
free fron1 conflict. That the instant case may
fall within that category in the minds of some
does not justify a departure from the law as we
find it."
By its decision the Court, in one fell swoop, without
warning or apparent justification, and without explanation, cast aside nearly a half-century of precedent and
embarked upon a

radicall~~

ne·w and uncharted course.

Certainly, the desire to see applicant given an award
under the facts and circumstances of this case cannot
justify the repudiation and disregard of our entire system of judicial review.
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POINT 2.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT RESULTS IN CONFUSION AND UNCERTAINTY BOTH AS TO THE SCOPE OF
THE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND THE STABILITY AND MEANING OF ITS DECISIONS, AND IT MAKES ADMINISTRATION
OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT VERY DIFFICULT AND UNCERTAIN.

Surprisingly, the Court's decision fails to specify
the basis of its action in overruling the Commission or
to t>xplain even in general terms the powers and discretion which the Cmnmission may hereafter exercise in
<'a:-;t·~ before it. Similarly, the decision avoids the obvion~ and pressing questions as to what standards of
review are to be applied in future appeals from the
Commission to the Supreme Court. It renders commission action a derelict upon uncharted seas, without powPr and without guidance.
Overruling, as it does, a determination of the Commission which, on the evidence, could have gone either
way. the decision leaves the Commission with the statutory duty of making judgments and handing down
d•·<'i::>ions which are, in practical effect, meaningless
and entitled to no respect whatever. In other words, the
l'ommi~sion appears to be relegated to the position of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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necessarily performing meaningl<'ss tasks with regard to
the essential functions which it was created to perform.
Its only significant remaining role appears to be merely
to gather the evidence upon which the Supreme Court,
on appeal, will pass its own judg1nents and base its own
decisions.
Certainly, in vir\\' of the radical departure from
precedent and the far-reaching implications which the
decision represents, even if conservatively construed,
some indication as to the basis upon which it is founded
and some explanation of its true scope become absolutely
essential to those who are affected by it and must govern
their conduct accordingly, including citizens, employers,
employees, legislators and the Commission.
What part, if any, of the great body of precedent
referred to above is now of any value or effect in the
interpretation of decisions of the Commission and appeal of those decisions to the Supreme Court¥ What
standards of review, if any, are to govern hereafter in
appeals from Commission rulings'? What powers, responsibility and discretion may the Commission hereafter exercise in cases where the evidence is basically
uncontradicted and reliable¥ Should the Commission
continue, on the basis of the evidence produced before it,
to make judgments and hand down decisions even when
they are obviously going to have no value or dignit~· to
either applicants or employPrs ¥
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~I u~t applieant~

and employers hereafter resort to

tlw costly and time-consuming procedure of an appeal
in all <·asPH in which the <·vid<>nr<· is essentially uncontmdieh•d and reliable¥ If not, what is the alternative
that ean IH· follmYPd 1 Are the determinations of all
otlwr ~tatP regulatory admini~trative bodies, including
thP Publie HPrvirP Com1nission and State Welfare Commi~~ion, to be similarly downgraded and disregarded,
:-;irwe all havP heretofore been subject to substantially
thP ~anw procedures and principles of review on appeal~
~,nrther, what is the present effect of the statutory
diredion that the Commission, Sec. 35-1-88, U.C.A. 19·53,
"may make its investigations in such manner as in its
j11d_qmntf is best rn lenlated to ascertain the substantial
rig-ht~ of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit
of thiH title!" (Emphasis added.)

The smooth, workable and economical administration of tlw \Vorkmen's Compensation Act requires more
than an effectivP Industrial Commission. Equally important ar<) tho~P vast numbers of employers and
indn~trie~ throughout the state "'ho are in daily association with the problems of compliance with the Act and
th,) furtherance of its aims. \Yorking with them, as

indi~1wn~ahle aicles, are those representatives of the
insurance industry and those trained in problen1s of
~~)If-insurance and :-;tate insurance, all of ·whmn must
know and understand the scope and meaning of the Act.
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The decision leaves these people in a quandary
about the many and varied gratuitous fringe benefits
and employeP recreational programs which, heretofore,
have been uniformly thought to be beyond the scope of
coverage. Before launching new programs, and before
renewing those in existence, management demands
answers to the questions of scope and cost of such programs.
As these unanswered questions show, the Court's
decision renders extremely difficult, if not impossible, a
proper administration of the Workmen's Compensation
Act. It is absolutely essential, therefore, that the Court
give without delay an explanation of its decision, if it
is to stand, and that it give some answer to the vital
question raised above. It is submitted that the result
reflected in these questions was not intended by the
Court.
POINT 3.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT IMPOSES AN UNDULY HEAVY BURDEN ON INDUSTRY AS REGARDS
EMPLOYMENT-RELATED ACTIVITIES AND WILL CAUSE
EMPLOYERS TO RESTRICT SEVERELY OR TO CANCEL
MANY OF THE BENEFITS AND SERVICES WHICH THEY
HAVE HERETOFORE PROVIDED.
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Apart from the disruption and uncertainty which
t ht~ ( 'ourt·~ dP<'ision creates, as noted above, it is un:-;ound and contrary to the public interest for the additional reason that it imposes a burden on industry
which i~ disproportionately related to any employment
a<'tiYity or benefit to the employer. Furthermore, it
nt-eP~:mrily penalizes attempts by employers to provide
gratuitou~ fringe benefits, services and conveniences
for Plltployt>P::-1. lTnder the decision any activity or servieP which ean bP construed as integrated in any way
with an employPr's business and which can be conceivably construed as advantageous to the employer, even
in terms of satisfaction of the employees, may require
en\·Pra~P under thr Act.
.T ustification for the broad assertions of the pre,·inu~ paragraph is found in the Court's statement, in

the fourth paragraph of its decision, that in determining if an aetiYity is covered by workmen's compensation, the "('~~Pntial thing" is that there "be some
~nh~tantial relationship" between the activity and "the
carrying on of the e1nplover's business. That is it
"'
'
~hnuld be of such a nature that it may reasonably be
a~~nmed that it ,,.otlld be of some benefit to the em-

ployer in the operation of his business or the advancenwnt of his interests." (Emphasis added.)
There is scarePly no facility or activity provided
g-ratnitnu~ly by an employer that may not be said, by
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some at least, to be of some benefit to the employer.
What may be "reasonably assumed" by one person
frequently is vigorously disputed by another - as
evidenced by close, but majority, results in elections,
majority verdicts and majority and dissenting opinions
of the courts.
If the decision of this Court stands, the determination of what may be "reasonably assumed" appears to
rest in the Court, rather than in the Commission.
Under such circumstances, what an employer may have
provided as a gratuity is now revealed as a potential
hazard and his reaction is predictable.
If an employer is to be compelled to provide coverage for these incidental, gratuitous and non-essential
activities, regardless of how distantly related they may
be to the tasks perfonned by the employee and regardless of the degree of control which the employer exercises thereby over the employee, it is obvious that
many such services and benefits will be discontinued
or never provided to the employee in the first instance.
Why should an employer continue to provide these free
services and subject itself to this avoidable liability1
More important, why should the employer be thus
penalized for voluntarily improving the lot of his
workers~ It is submitted that the policy of the law

should be to encourage, rather than to penalize, these
widespread, beneficial practices of employers.
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'rlw dPri~ion hen' under attaek disregards the basic
standard~, both statutory and decisional, which have
~uidPd and restrained the Supreme Court in its review
nt' hundreds of decisions of the Industrial Commission
ovPt' thP ~·par~ .
.\ JH'Pcedent lH'Pd not be followed, merely because
it is a pn'e(•dPnt, but tested rules and standards should
not be ::-;wPpt away unless the reason for their existence
has ht>Pn examined and found no longer valid. No such
Pxamination \ra~ attPmpted in this case.
l. pon reflection and upon analysis of the far ranging 1'1'1\•d::-; of this (lPei:.;ion, effeets upon those who administer the \Y orkmen's Compensation Act and upon
those who mu:.;t live within it, the Court should conclude
that tlw (lecision ~hould be recalled, thP case should be
n•ar~uPd and. upon such event, the order of the Industrial Connni~~inn should be affirnwd.
Respectfully submitted,
JOH~

H. SXO\V

Attornroy for Defendants
701 Continental Bank Bldg.
f'alt Lake City, Utah
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